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Introduction 
 
Lots of research in social sciences and management have highlighted that categorization 
is crucial to the construction of markets and to how we make sense of the world  
(Douglas, 1986; Zerubavel, 1991, 1997). Categories impose coherence and create shared 
understandings (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Lounsbury & Rao, 2004). They are 
considered as instances of commensuration as they provide basis for comparison, 
commensurability and valuation (Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Zuckerman, 1999, 2004). 
By influencing perception and interpretation, they act as institutions that facilitate 
exchange, shape economic outcomes (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010) and the identities and 
interests of actors (Lounsbury & Rao, 2004; Zhao, 2005). They define social and 
symbolic boundaries and rules for inclusion (Lamont, 2001; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; 
Zhao, 2005). When they change, they can significantly alter the nature of the markets in 
which actors compete. In numerous organizational fields such as mutual fund industry 
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(Lounsbury & Rao, 2004), automobile industry (Rosa et al., 1999), the stock market 
(Zuckerman, 2000), art (DiMaggio, 1987), music (Anand and Peterson, 2000), 
categorization has exerted a great impact on the social structure and social outcome 
(Zhao, 2005: 196-197). This stream of research not only demonstrates that categorization 
is socially constructed (Kennedy, 2008) but also develops arguments on its consequences 
that confer social identities, signify social standing of actors and involve political 
struggles between different interest groups (Zhao, 2005: 179). Therefore, each 
categorization has a socio-political origin, reflecting diverse values and interests. More 
recently, research on categorization has focused on how shared meanings of new market 
categories are established and how such meanings come to shape collective perceptions 
of value (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010: 1281). All these analyses provide insights for our 
understanding of categorisation from a sociological viewpoint.  
Yet, few studies have precisely examined the process by which attempts at categorizing 
are contested. Some research on change in categorization has primarily focused on 
factors of durability and argues that powerful actors can preserve the existing structure of 
categories (Lounsbury & Rao, 2004). While it focuses on the political dynamics of 
market classification (Lounsbury & Rao, 2004; Zhao, 2005), it has not examined the 
process and means whereby actors resist attempts to establish categorisation. In this 
paper, we try to address this gap in the literature by examining the way different market 
participants resist, promote or adapt to solutions that will potentially significantly alter 
the definition and the nature of the markets in which actors compete. Our emphasis will 
be on the use of definitions, standards and categories within controversies. Specifically, 
this study addresses two research questions about categorical evolution in markets and 
political dynamics: What are the means by which powerful actors resist categories and 
contest a certain definition of the market? How do struggles around categories envision a 
certain meaning of the market (Miller & O’Leary, 2007)?  
We address these questions through a case study of the process of OTC market 
transformation. Following the recent financial crisis, OTC markets undergo unseen 
regulatory pressure to move from their opaque bilateral transactions mechanism towards 
a more walrasian mechanism where competitive processes would produce more price 
transparency. More precisely, we analyze the battle over categories involved in the new 
regulation process. We see the categorization process as a possible instance of 
commensuration (Espeland and Stevens, 1998) that makes things comparable and 
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valuable, and allows actors to make a new sense of the world (DiMaggio, 1997; 
Lounsbury & Rao, 2004). The evolution at stake is contested by various market 
participants, though. Several issues are on the agenda, namely the migrating from 
bilateral and manual to multilateral and automated trading mechanisms, the increasing of 
the use of central counterparties through clearing houses and the improvement of 
collateral management for the subset of deals that will remain bilateral. In short, the 
legislative proposal to move as much as OTC markets to exchanges or multilateral 
platforms as possible, has been met with strong resistance by the major broker dealers.  
Our research is based on a qualitative study of the evolution of OTC markets between 
2008 and 2011. Our objective is to understand the intentions of the actors, their 
representation of the market, their metrics, their arguments, and their own interpretation 
of how regulation will change the market and what they think is desirable. We focus on 
the type of categories, and standards used or promoted by various market participants; 
and mainly great investment banks and regulators.  
We highlight that resistance is based on the creation of incommensurables (Espeland and 
Stevens, 1998) and on the hyper-instrumentalization of the solutions promoted by the 
defenders of former conceptions of the market. The increasing technicality of the debate 
around platforms and categories, and the sophistication of solutions refer to an 
unquestionable reality that forcloses and neutralises any debate. Additionally, we show 
that resistance to the new categorization relies mainly on defining the market in a very 
specific way. The rhetoric used by dominant incumbents is made on an ad hoc basis that 
promotes a specific nature of OTC markets, in very contradiction with the financial 
theory they were used to promote.   
The rest of this paper is in four parts. First, we focus on the theoretical foundation of our 
research, mainly the literature on categorization, and the political efforts associated with 
this process. The second part of our paper describes our research method, a longitudinal 
qualitative study over the period 2008-2011, based on the analysis of secondary data. 
Next, we study the evolution of OTC market, the struggles around categories and devices 
and the way powerful actors resist to categorization. In the fourth and final part of this 
paper, we discuss the main conclusions of our research. 
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Theoretical background 
Categorization as an instance of commensuration  
Generally speaking, commensuration is defined as a process through which, different 
objects, attributes or people are compared, according to a common metric (Espeland & 
Stevens, 1998: 316–17). It is a way to reduce and simplify disparate information into 
numbers. Commensuration is a way to standardize relations between different things, to 
depersonalize and to reduce the relevance of the context (1998: 321).  
Some scholars argue that categorization can be considered as an instance of 
commensuration (Lounsbury & Rao, 2004: 973). According to Kennedy (2003), a 
category is an exchange referred to by a label whose meaning is a matter of substantial 
collective agreement by the audiences who use it. As Navis & Glynn (2010: 440) put it, 
categories have two main properties: 1) constituent members whose inclusion is defined 
by rules or boundaries pertaining to a common type of product or service and 2) a 
concept label that reflects the commonalities that link together the members of the 
category.  
Stable shared meanings are indeed essential to the process by which the terms of 
comparison and commensuration are established (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010: 1283). By 
listing, classifying and grouping things within a category, commensurability is created, 
social comparisons are facilitated and, producers and consumers are allowed to make 
sense of the world (Anand and Peterson, 2000; DiMaggio, 1987; Lounsbury & Rao, 
2004: 974). Using a case study of law schools, Espeland and Sauder (2007) explain, for 
example, why rankings have permeated the legal education system, how they change 
perceptions, and how they “recreate social worlds.” This process has an important 
rhetorical aspect (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991), and requires significant resources and 
organization. Additionally, some instances of commensuration help to constitute what 
they want to measure. For example, grading systems create explicit categories of relative 
quality and hence relative value that make possible trade in products that may not yet 
exist (Cronon, 1991; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Porter, 1996). Hence, categorization is 
essential to commensuration and market construction. It provides “rules and 
understandings that are necessary to make structured exchange possible in the first place” 
(Fligstein, 2001: 32). As Lounsbury & Rao (2004: 973) note, the very idea of markets 
depends on standardization and the comparability of the objects being exchanged 
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(Douglas & Isherwoo, 1979). Categorization supplies cognitive frameworks (DiMaggio, 
1997), and defines boundaries (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Lamont, 2001; Lamont & 
Molnar, 2002). These latter present or confirm a social order with specific meanings and 
legitimacy (Zelizer, 1988; Zhao, 2005: 187). To wit, categorization organizes 
information, generates shared understanding, affects valuation and finally, facilitates 
exchange in market settings (Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010).  
Sometimes categorization and standards of value are redefined or reconstituted 
(Lounsbury & Rao, 2004) and involve a transformation of markets. Building on Zelizer 
(1983), Quinn (2008) describes for example the changing secondary market for life 
insurance in the United States. She shows that the evolution in product categorization has 
radically modified the market for life insurance and how it has grown from “a scattered 
practice” (sacred revulsion) into a rationalized field (rationalization). Other scholars 
highlight that sophisticated forms of commensuration and categorization have really 
transformed financial markets (Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 325-6).  In this perspective, 
Kennedy, Lo and Lounsbury (2010) argue for a vision of market categories as the 
vocabulary for describing a demand environment that is always changing and where the 
landscape of competition is at stake.  
Categorization and commensuration are not inevitable, however. As social processes 
(Desrosières, 1990, 1998), they require lots of work and effort to accomplish, since they 
integrate disparate value systems or different interests, reconfigure them and somehow 
change the world (Stevens & Espeland, 2004). As categorization involves not only 
“framing” (Callon & Muniesa, 2005), that is, a definition of what a market transaction 
formally includes, but also an interplay between different actors with potentially different 
worldviews, we argue that categorization is a contested political process.  
 
Categorization as a contested political process 
Commensuration and categorization are modes of power and they are highly political 
(Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Lounsbury & Rao, 2004) as they reconstruct relations of 
authority, create new entities and establish new interpretive frameworks (Espeland and 
Stevens, 1998: 323). Selection of a particular category by social actors is a political 
action (Albert & Whetten, 1985), it is negotiated between interest groups and the final 
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categorization system is often the result of political struggles between them (Zhao, 2005: 
191). Attempts at manipulating the categories to maintain order and to consolidate their 
position by dominant groups highlight that categorization is shaped by the politics of 
markets (Fligstein, 1986; 2001) and is driven by political dynamics. Lounsbury & Rao 
(2004) examine for example the role of industry media and powerful producers in 
category evolution in the American mutual fund industry. They emphasize that when 
powerful producers dominate a category, they can counteract the influx of new entrants 
and encourage industry media to preserve the existing structure of categories. Overall, 
dominant incumbents always strive to claim the desirable categories in order to signify 
and consolidate their standing (Zhao, 2005: 188-191).  They often take advantage of 
economic, political and cultural resources (Bourdieu, 1984) to control the categorization 
system. As Zhao (2005: 193) illustrates, in the French wine industry, the categorization 
system embodies the political power. The 1855 classification of Bordeaux wines was 
indeed controlled by elites winemakers to protect their own interests and to exclude other 
winemakers.  
Sometimes, actors resist commensuration and categorization. One strategy can be to 
create what Espeland & Stevens (1998: 332) call incommensurables; between children 
and money, for example (Zelizer, 1985). This process requires work and draws 
boundaries around the things whose value is to be kept. The most frequent and durable 
claims about incommensurability occur at the borderlands between institutional spheres, 
where different modes of valuing overlap and conflict (Espeland, 1998). Categorization 
can also be contested because of the loss of elite discretion that it fosters (Espeland & 
Stevens, 1998: 330). The legitimacy offered by numbers and standardization diminishes 
autonomy, since discretion is replaced by disciplined methods: “This is why quantitative 
technologies are the province of weak elites and why they are resisted by those whose 
authority depends on expert judgement, character or informal knowledge” (Espeland & 
Stevens, 1998: 331). In his history of quantification, Porter (1996) shows for example 
that insurance was originally seen as a local problem. Actuaries believed in their 
subjectivity, their own expert judgment and appreciation. However, while Victorian 
actuaries did not really believe in the possibility of standardization, and of reducing their 
work to calculative routines, the push for “objectification” came instead from regulatory 
authorities. Historically, the process by which idiosyncratic risks are pooled to be handled 
homogenously appears unnatural and occasionally requiring strong state intervention. 
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Then, the success of categorization may depend on an “intrusive institutional apparatus” 
and specific organizational activities (Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999). As 
standardization is a socio-political achievement, the role of the State can sometimes be 
central to catalyze homogenization and commensuration.  
To wit, the political nature of categorization (Lounsbury & Rao, 2004; Zhao, 2005) and 
the idea that categories are products of practical political processes (Zuckerman, 1999) 
are henceforward acknowledged in the literature. But few studies precisely examine the 
process and means whereby actors resist categorization. While Espeland & Stevens 
(1998: 323) note that “we are more likely to notice failure of commensuration than its 
widespread varied success”, we think that we need to explain more precisely how people 
contest categorization (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). We focus on the means used by 
dominant incumbents to resist categorization and we answer two main research 
questions: What are the means by which powerful actors resist categories and contest a 
certain definition of the market? How do struggles around categories envision a certain 
meaning of the market?  
We believe that the current regulatory pressure on the OTC markets offers a unique 
opportunity to conduct insightful investigations to understand the role of the struggle over 
meaning construction in the definition of modern financial markets and to gauge the 
power of the actors involved according to their ability to alter or resist categorization. 
 
Methodology 
 
The setting of our study is OTC markets in the light of recent regulatory change. Our 
research is based on a qualitative study of their evolution between 2008 and 2011. Our 
objective is to understand the intentions and beliefs of the actors, their representation of 
the market, their metrics, their arguments, and their own interpretation of how regulation 
will change the market and what they think is desirable. We focus on the type of 
categories, language and standards used or promoted by various market participants; and 
mainly great investment banks and regulators.  
We chose this case because it provided several benefits as a “theoretical sample” 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010). The time period we cover 
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in the case includes a crisis and a regulatory evolution, which is best illustrated by 
attempts at introducing a change in the way OTC markets are categorized. It was then 
possible to analyze how main actors of the market, and particularly big banks make sense 
of categorization and how they accepted it or not. Besides, our case provides a good 
illustration of the resistance to change, which is embodied in the struggles around 
categories, and mainly on the struggles over the definitions of products and markets. 
Finally, this case is particularly appropriate for our demonstration, because due to the 
recent crisis and to different public initiatives, banks, experts, regulators, and media do 
not hesitate to express themselves, to give their views on the contributions and limitations 
of future developments, through a large number of texts. 
 
Sources of data 
Our objective is to offer a description of OTC markets and its recent evolution, its 
instruments and devices, in order to improve our understanding of our object. In the 
second stage, we attempt to put forward the views and types of arguments that agents use 
when debating. To reach these objectives, we used multiple sources of empirical 
evidence, and mainly textual sources, which can be divided into three main categories. 
Archival materials. We consulted many categories of archival information (reports, white 
papers, studies of the Bank of International Settlements or IOSCO1.) to better understand 
the context of OTC markets, to confirm the main recent events in these markets, and also 
to provide textual accounts of debates and discussions. We also studied information, 
texts, and discourses stemming from main actors’ websites around new devices, such as 
ISDA2 or Tabbgroup3.  
Mifid-consultation. We have analyzed contributions to the public consultation organized 
by the European Commission on the basis of a consultation document on the review of 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) from 08/12/2010 to 02/02/2011. 
The consultation’s purpose was “ to consult market participants, regulators and other 
stakeholders on possible changes to the regulatory framework established by MiFID in 
the field of investment services and activities as well as markets in financial instruments”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
2 International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
3 Founded in 2003, TABB Group is a financial markets' research and strategic advisory firm focused on 
capital markets.   
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It resulted in more than 4200 responses, which are supposed to “provide important 
guidance for preparing a formal Commission proposal”. A careful analysis of these 
responses provides interesting results, in particular as regards the globally adverse 
position of main investment banks towards the regulation to come and the means they use 
to resist against unwanted change. Knowing that these large financial institutions are at 
the core of OTC markets and are involved in the majority of the deals struck on these 
markets, the consultation responses provide a rich database to observe resistance to the 
new regulation and to study the arguments used for that purpose. 
 
Press articles. To review press articles, we used the Factiva database, which provides 
business news collected from 14,000 sources. The articles were chosen from 2008 to 
2011. In total, 150 articles made up our database, beginning with research on the terms 
“OTC markets” and “regulation”. From these documents, we are able not only to 
reconstitute main events, but also to focus on the representations and discourses of 
different actors regarding OTC markets and its recent evolution regarding regulation. 
 
Data analysis 
Our analysis was conducted in several stages. Following Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Yin (1989) and building on press articles, we first arranged the data into chronological 
account in order to produce a “facts database”. We identified the main actors and events 
in the evolution of OTC markets from 2008 to 2011. We then tried to capture the 
“justificatory accounts” of the different actors (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Huault 
and Rainelli, 2009) engaged in OTC markets and its evolution. We focused on an initial 
set of narratives stemming from the Mifid-consultation, reviewed them carefully and 
interpreted the data to point out three main fronts in the resistance of banks to any 
change: 1/ struggles over the definition of the products, 2/struggles over the kinds of 
electronic venues, 3/debates about the boundaries of the market and more precisely, 
regarding who is a legitimate participant to take part to the market. We used then the 
other data sources to verify these different recurring themes.  
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Resisting categorization 
Faced with political pressure and public opinion’s wrath in the aftermath of the subprime 
crisis, regulators and public authorities of developed countries have taken spectacular 
though yet only preliminary steps toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets. 
While the size gained by these markets and the growing dependence of the whole 
financial sphere on their functioning had remained unnoticed for years, the subprime 
crash suddenly shed a crude light on a form of markets which had been tending to 
become dominant in modern finance (Huault & Rainelli, 2011). The lack of academic as 
well as non-academic knowledge over these markets became obvious in the favor of the 
crisis. Ignorance of the most basic characteristics of OTC markets such as their actual 
size, the exact number and nature of players, the number of transactions involved, the 
price quoted, or the liquidity of the market came to be recognized as a problem.  This 
may explain why, in a collective move, regulators of both side of the Atlantic have 
adopted a regulatory approach favoring the displacement of as many as possible OTC 
transactions onto organized markets. They see it as a means “to tackle less regulated or 
more opaque parts of the financial system and to improve the organization, transparency 
and oversight of all market segments”4. The philosophy of regulations to come has been 
sketched in the Dodd Franck Act for the US. It is still under CFTC5 consultation. As for 
Europe, the project is developed mostly in the so-called MiFID 2, also under European 
Commission consultation. In both cases, the main axis hinges on the idea developed 
under the September 2009 G20 summit that “all standardized OTC derivative contracts 
should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and 
cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest."   
 
Building on this idea, the proposed reformed MiFID aims to ensure that “where 
appropriate, trading in standardized OTC derivatives moves to exchanges or electronic 
platforms”. It considers that “at a minimum, this would imply that trading on exchanges 
and electronic platforms becomes the norm when the market in a given derivative is 
suitably developed”. In this paper, we propose to analyze contributions to the public 
consultation organized by the European Commission on the basis of a consultation 
document on the review of the MiFID. We aim at understanding the battle over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 MifiD Public consultation document 2011 
5 Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
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categories involved in the process by which regulators attempt to translate general 
regulatory principles into implementable regulation. As a matter of fact, the G20 
injunction cannot become embodied in a given piece of legislation, lest ambiguity about 
what is meant by “when appropriate”, “standardized OTC derivatives”, or a “suitably 
developed market” is alleviated. The resistance opposed by incumbent firms, namely big 
investment banks, which deem they have a lot to loose in the transformation of OTC 
markets into organized market, therefore firstly focuses on a contestation over the 
categories proposed by the legislator. These categories especially regard the definition of 
products falling in the scope of the legislation to come and the regulatory regimes of the 
platforms proposed by the regulators. Second, dominant investment banks also struggle 
to maintain social boundaries between their high status group often referred to as market 
specialists and other actors, which access to the post regulation market incumbent firms 
try to control. Third, the struggle over categories and social boundaries as it appears in 
the contributions to the MIFID consultation seem to require from various interest groups 
the capacity to resort to pieces of cultural material, by which the concepts used as matrix 
for categorization can be granted or, on the opposite, denied legitimacy. Our analysis 
sheds light on the relevance of cultural repertoires in the categorization battle and 
assesses their importance as regards the regulation of financial markets. 
 
Creating Incommensurables 
Struggles over the definition of products 
According to the proposed MIFID regulation in its most general labeling, the guideline is 
that, once it is adopted, all “eligible” OTC derivatives should be cleared via central 
counterparties and move to organized platforms. The regulation thus proposes no less 
than the transformation of OTC contracts -mere contracts which terms have been agreed 
upon by the counterparties to the deal- into deals that could be exchanged on a market, 
very much as stocks are on equity markets. This transformation should take place, “where 
appropriate”, “when a market in a market derivative is suitably developed”, and it should 
concern all “standardized OTC derivatives”. As all these expressions require further 
definitions, investment banks devote much of the space they use to answer the 
consultation to contesting definitions in the proposed regulation and developing 
arguments towards the categorizations that they would deem preferable.  
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The ISDA for example provides extensive development on the difficulty of defining 
which OTC products would be “suitable”, or  “eligible” to specific pieces of regulation. 
First, ISDA advocates,  
 
“The assessment of whether a derivative is suitable for trading on a particular trading venue 
should be made separately to the assessment of its eligibility for central clearing”. 
 
 As regards trading on a venue, it seems that standardization of the product would not 
provide a clear-cut criterion as opposed to the regulator assertion: 
 
 “It is not always appropriate for derivatives trading to take place on organized trading platforms 
even if transactions have been become relatively standardized  in  some  respects”. 
 
 and  
 
 “A contract might exhibit  the  necessary  standardization  for  clearing,  but  
nonetheless be unsuitable  for  trading  on  a  particular venue, whether Regulated Market, 
MTF or OTF.” 
 
Liquidity does not seem to provide any better criterion, as  
“derivatives  trade  far  less  frequently  than  securities,  such  that  many  products  will  not  be  
suitable  for  trading  on  a  particular  venue”.     
 
Moreover “a liquidity criterion would be difficult to administer in practice” and the ISDA 
urges regulators, if they stick to the idea of using a liquidity threshold as part of the 
assessment of whether a product should be traded on a venue, to be aware that the 
exercise would be fraught with difficulties. The threshold they insist should be:  
 “set at a realistic level that differentiates between products, capable of being calculated and 
predicted, subject to periodic review and able to accommodate temporary changes in the 
market”.  
 
 As for contracts eligible for clearing, the situation is by no way simpler: one will have to 
distinguish between eligible and non-eligible contracts and stay aware that some 
contracts may “cease to be eligible”. Complexity provides no more useful benchmark for 
the design of categories, as, as is several times emphasized in the ISDA, BBA6 and other 
investment banks responses,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 British Bankers Association 
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“a false link is sometimes  made  between  product  complexity  and  product  risk,  which  leads  
to  the  illusion  that  complex  instruments  are  automatically  high-risk  instruments”.   
 
The same example, described at length in many banks’ responses, aims at demonstrating 
how in OTC derivatives markets, product complexity is often the result of products 
being designed to reduce client’s risks, and therefore do not call for specific risk 
protection through clearing.  
 
Overall, the arguments developed seek to undermine the categorization proposed in the 
piece of legislation by depicting them as irrelevant and/or impossible to implement in 
practice. The various criteria provided by the levels of standardization, liquidity or 
complexity are presented as not operational, creating a sense that the categorizations 
proposed by the regulators do not fit OTC products, although no alternative is proposed 
by institutions resisting the new regulation.  
 
Struggles over electronic venues’ regime 
 
Besides the debate on products definition, a second front is opened by the proposed 
regulation as regards the kind of electronic venues on which OTC products could be 
exchanged. Since MiFID 1 in Europe, financial instruments can be exchanged either on a 
traditional stock exchange, called Regulated Markets -or RM- in the proposed piece of 
regulation on or electronic platforms called multi-lateral trading facilities (MTF), which 
since 2007 tend to take significant market share from the incumbent equity exchanges. 
MTF allows eligible contract participants to trade a variety of securities, via electronic 
systems operated by market operators or large investment firms. In addition to having the 
obligation to establish “transparent and non discretionary rules for fair and orderly 
trading7”, MTF shall answer pre trade and post trade transparency requirements. In 
particular, they should make public current bid and offer prices and the depth of trading 
interests at these prices, except for orders of specific size or type and have, in this respect 
the same kind of obligations as regulated market, “except where justified by the specific 
nature of the MTF”.  As regards post trade transparency, MTF have the obligation to 
make public the price, volume and time of the transactions executed under their systems, 
with possible exemptions that have to be justified. Requiring that OTC derivatives move 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Mifid 1, art 14 
	   14	  
to electronic platforms raises an issue as to whether the MTF “regime”, with its post trade 
and especially pre trade transparency obligations is suited for the kind of products usually 
exchanged OTC. Regulators themselves seem to be ready to admit it might not and 
propose the creation of platforms of another type, called SEF (Swap Execution Facilities) 
in the US proposed reform, and OTF (Organized Trading Facilities) in the European 
Commission Proposal. The debate then focuses on the transparency requirements that 
will be asked from OTFs. While post trade transparency entails limited debate, - no one 
expects OTC markets to be able to durably get away from that obligation-, pre trade 
transparency, on the opposite has become the issue. The MiFID proposal is that venues 
“would be required to make its quote both in terms of price and volume available to the 
public”, suggesting that the OTF regime is not meant to be significantly different from 
the MTF regime in terms of transparency obligations. This however seems amendable in 
the view of many regulators. The AMF for example suggests a distinction between a sort 
of “supra-OTF regime” for which: 
“requirements (governance/organization, multilaterality, pre-trade transparency etc..) should be 
very demanding, and “regular” OTFs, primarily aimed at trading in less liquid financial 
instruments”.  
 
In a long and circumstantiated report, the IOSCO concludes to the necessity of using both 
more structured and less structured platforms, according to the liquidity of the derivatives 
products targeted.  
 
Overall, the September G-20 statement, according to which all standardized OTC 
derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, 
where appropriate, results in a blossoming of definitions of platforms of all kinds, 
reflected in the multiplication of acronyms (MTF, SEF, OTF), regimes (the AMF speaks 
of a supra and of a regular regime for OTFs) and characterization (more or less structured 
along various dimensions, with special focus as regards pre trade transparency 
requirements). 
 
Opponents to too stringent a regulation, for their sake, attempt to push their demand of as 
little constraint as possible as much as they can. The ISDA for example insists that 
the OTF regime must protect the existing diversity of models for negotiating and 
executing derivatives transaction. It warns that “if the OTF regime is inflexible in its 
design and/or promoted too aggressively for products currently traded OTC”, -meaning if 
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the OTF’s regime requires stringent pre trade transparency-, then the market would 
concentrate into a narrower range of products, hampering market participants to manage 
risks appropriately and conducing to loss of market efficiency.  
The fact that the legislative proposal to move OTC markets to multilateral trading venues 
has been met with “more resistance from the major dealer community, than any of the 
other (financial regulation) proposal” is, according to authors of the January 2010 Tabb 
report, no wonder. Emphasizing  
“the resistance to adopting any mechanisms that attempts to pierce the veil of opaque pricing 
currently enjoyed by major dealers”  
 
experts of the Tabb Group point to the comfortable economic profits allowed by the 
absence of any pre-trade transparency on the current OTC voice market paradigm and 
estimate  that there is 
 
“as much as 40$ billion of annual revenues (excluding credit derivatives) at stake in global OTC 
derivatives for the 20 largest broker dealers”. 
 
As compressed margin and threatened profitability are seen by incumbent banks as the 
likely result of the proposed reform, one understands their efforts in contesting the 
legislative proposal requiring investment firms executing trades OTC to provide “quotes 
to a large number of investors at a price close to market value from comparable 
instruments traded on organized venues”.  
While a large investment bank contests the principle itself: 
"In general terms transparency in markets can help to build confidence, by ensuring that 
participants have access to information. However, there are products and markets, which 
are so illiquid, that revealing trade information could actually be detrimental to buyers and 
sellers. We have to balance the benefits of transparency versus the potential downsides". 
(Citi- Mifid consultation) 
 
the ISDA grasps the opportunity to discuss that particular point by developing 
sophisticated definitional issues. Contesting the term “quote”, for at least the more 
structured (in other words less standardized) products, the ISDA proposes that the price 
of OTC derivatives is seen as a price for a “solution”, which can “take weeks, if not 
months to finalize”. Highly bespoke products have “by definition no benchmark price” 
and apparently identical products might differ in prices according to the 
“perceived creditworthiness of the counterparty”:  
“A price will always reflect the situation at the time it is made and therefore will not necessarily 
be comparable”.  
 
	   16	  
The notion of quote is thus not relevant as regards bespoke products and pre-trade 
transparency is inadequate to most OTC products.  
 
On the whole, as regards the definition of venues on which OTC derivatives will be 
exchanged in the future, the struggle of major investment banks against pre-trade 
transparency obligations consists in demanding flexibility while creating as much 
complexity and sophistication as possible to resist unwelcome evolution. This results in a 
multiplication of acronyms and definitions reflecting a strategy to hamper the drastic 
change in the status quo involved in the regulation to come and perceived by major 
dealers as a threat to their profits. 
 
Maintaining social boundaries and status 
In the political struggle over the regulation to come, products definition is not the only 
issue at stake. Among other things, the 2009 crisis has revealed the very high 
concentration of OTC markets, where a group of large investment banks tend to be 
involved in most transactions (Huault & Rainelli, 2009; European Central Bank report, 
2010). These major dealers, sometimes referred to as the G14 or G15 group8, have been 
working hard in creating, structuring and organizing OTC markets (Huault & Rainelli, 
2009) and are therefore eager to defend the paradigm they created against the regulators’ 
will to change the rules of the game. In this paradigm sometimes depicted as “a market 
for specialists”, major dealers, according to the Tabb Group report “represent a 
hermetically sealed wall of opaque pricing between a wholesale dealer-to-dealer market 
and a buy side oriented, dealer-to customer market”. Enjoying high status and reaping 
important economic benefits from the status quo, the G14 members therefore aim at 
maintaining social boundaries, trying to secure access to the post-regulation derivatives 
and control that of lower status actors. This social boundaries issue is tackled directly in 
the contributions to the MifID consultation. It also emerges in the related issue of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   This includes the following banks: Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital, BNP Paribas, 
Citigroup, Commerzbank AG, Crédit Suisse, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman, Sachs & Co., HSBC Group, JP 
Morgan, Chase, Morgan Stanley, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group, Société Générale, UBS AG, 
Wachovia Bank.  
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creation of clearing houses, which is not directly debated in the proposed MifID 
legislation. 
The reluctance from large investment banks to change in the status quo as regards the 
role of market specialists is illustrated for example in this contribution to the MiFID 
consultation: 
 “Finally, one should keep in mind that the more transparent the markets, the more difficult it 
would be to limit their access to all sorts of investors. It may not be wise to let retail 
investors feel as if it would be good for them to invest in derivatives instruments because 
they are traded on an exchange (or trading platform)” (ABBL Bankers Luxembourg- Mifid 
consultation). 
 
The debate on who should be allowed to participate is also especially exacerbated as 
regards one reform which is not at the core of the MiFID revision and was envisioned by 
the regulators prior to it: the creation of clearing houses to clear “eligible” OTC products. 
Although the establishment of clearing houses is not altogether welcome by incumbent 
banks, they are aware that this development can be turned into a profitable opportunity, 
provided they secure their access as members of the clearing houses and keep challengers 
outside, in order to avoid sharing profits from clearing activities with them. While the 
CFTC Chairman advocates eligibility requirements that promote large inclusiveness, to 
enable fair and open access to clearing, investment banks struggle on restricting the 
number of those who will be allowed to participate in clearing houses. Embracing some 
views like Darrel Duffie9’s, professor at Stanford, according to which it will be hard for 
the dealers to keep their market shares if every investment firm who can prove its 
creditworthiness is allowed into the clearinghouses, large investment banks try to 
establish strict membership rules that require members to hold large amounts of capital in 
derivatives units. Deutsche Bank argues for example that this system will reduce the risk 
in the market.  
 
By attempting to control clearinghouses, great investment banks probably hope to be able 
to influence the decisions of which transactions must be cleared and which do not need 
to. The ability of the major dealers including JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley to protect their position and margins is well known and their attempt to 
control the clearing-house business is but one example. Already dominating the risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Source: Louise Story, New York Times, 12/12/2010 
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committees of the two most important existing clearinghouses in the United States, they 
are referred to by critic voices as “the derivatives dealers club”. As Louise Story from the 
New York Times writes10, they meet on the third Wednesday of every month and form a 
powerful committee, which aim is to protect their dominance as a high status group over 
a multi-billion dollar market. As regards clearing houses for derivatives however, they 
are challenged by non-incumbent firms who protest that the exchange’s requirements 
proposed by major dealers, by drastically limiting participation to member of the club, 
are purely prohibitive. In reaction to the Bank of New York Mellon case, where a smaller 
stakeholder was kept from becoming a clearing member of three of the four main 
clearinghouses on the argument that its derivatives operation has too little capital, and 
thus potentially poses too much risk to the overall market, a new association called the 
SDMA11 was created. Presenting itself as challenger to the ISDA, the SDMA advocates 
the opening of clearing to more participants. Constituted of approximately twenty 
independent firms, it argues against the requirements as arbitrary and acting as an 
“anticompetitive weapon”. The SDMA asserts the more members in a clearinghouse, the 
more liquidity available in case of a clearing member failure:  
"There's a constant need for alternative providers of liquidity and market intelligence… More 
liquidity will lower transaction costs, increase transparency and protect customer 
anonymity." (Mike Hisler, partner at investment bank Hexagon Securities, and member of 
the SDMA) 
 
Overall, beyond struggle on product and trading venues categorization, resistance to 
legislation from major dealers also take the form of defending social boundaries between 
their high status group or club and non-incumbent firms in an attempt to preserve the 
status quo as much as possible. The economic paradigm they have organized and 
structured has provided them with large economic profits they fight to preserve by both 
resisting new regulation and trying to influence it so that important features of the status 
quo such as social boundaries between major players and others are ultimately 
maintained in the new rule of the game.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “House advantage. A secretive banking elite rules derivatives trading”, New York Times, 12-12-2010 
11 Swaps and Derivatives Market Association.  
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Discussing market nature 
Generally speaking, the typical attitude of major investment banks towards the proposed 
regulation of OTC derivatives market is one of seemingly systematic resistance against 
change. This reveals a more fundamental and general disagreement with the regulator as 
regards the relevance of being forced to create a new market structure to replace the 
former OTC one. The general perspective of the proposed regulation tends to corner 
incumbent firms in a defensive position, where their arguments ultimately aim at 
maintaining the status quo as much as possible. As the regulators’ proposal is that “all 
standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic 
trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-
2012 at the latest", opponents to the reform have to develop a conceptual line of 
reasoning showing that the traditionally desired feature of exchanges such as product 
standardization, liquidity or price transparency are unwanted on up-to-now OTC markets. 
The lack of knowledge on OTC markets (How liquid are in reality these markets? How 
much standardized are bilateral deals?) is a handicap in the development of their 
argument, but a further difficulty is the absence of any conceptualization of what a 
“specialists” market is, what it should be and what features should be developed for such 
a market to function satisfactorily. On the opposite, neo classical financial theory, which 
provided the matrix for most of the innovations traded on OTC markets (Huault and 
Rainelli, 2010) has heavily conceptualized on financial market efficiency providing a 
unique view of ideal financial markets, very much inspired by the walrasian auction 
market model, which happens to be at odds with OTC markets (Huault and Rainelli, 
2011). Major dealers therefore are faced with the difficulty of having to combat a widely 
shared theoretical vision of proper financial market functioning without any possibility to 
draw alternative arguments from existing conceptualizations. Dealing with this void is 
not an easy task. The recurrently emerging argument about the “nature” of OTC markets, 
allegedly different from standard equity markets on which regulators want to align them, 
illustrates this difficulty, especially as no precise definition of what is meant by this 
concept of “market nature” succeeds in materializing. 
 In opposition to regulators such as the SEC Chairman who would like derivatives 
rules to reflect the virtues of the current equities market, i.e competition, large access, 
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liquidity and transparency12, banks repeatedly contend that OTC markets belong to a 
different species of market, and obey to a qualitatively and structurally different logic.  
 
“We are concerned that the approach proposed does not fully take into account the nature of the 
OTC derivatives market. We feel it is essential to understand that execution mechanisms 
for OTC products must be appropriate” (Deutsche Bank-Mifid consultation).  
 
“There have not been, to the best of our knowledge, any serious academic studies demonstrating 
that the transposition of the equity model to OTC derivative products will be economically 
more efficient than the current trading model”. (BNP-Paribas- Mifid consultation) 
Forcing OTC markets to adopt a structure that is not “appropriate” because it does not 
respect their nature is depicted as potentially very detrimental for the common good and 
likely to generate unwanted results as regards the very aim of the regulators: 
 
“Efforts to centralize and standardize OTC trading could: 
- Harm the EU market as a whole - investors cannot get the specific solutions they seek and 
this may, in turn, have an effect on the services they provide ; 
- Lead to an actual increase in systemic risk on account of restrictions in OTC trading (and 
the ability of market participants to hedge);  
- Harm the reputation of the EU as a financial centre with innovative and sophisticated 
products being traded out of Asia instead”. (Crédit Suisse- Mifid Consultation) 
 
"By moving OTC products onto exchanges, we would expect to see a reduction in liquidity that 
may negatively impact the sought-after price transparency," (Bruce Collins, deputy 
chairman of Tradition, an interdealer broker based in London). Source: Dow Jones 
Newswires, 14-5-2009) 
 
“Too much transparency will create cost, noise and, as discussed, could have a negative impact 
on market liquidity, in particular for large OTC trades”. (Deutsche Bank- Mifid 
Consultation) 
 
Two arguments are used to support the idea that too much attack on the status quo would 
eventually prove harmful. One is naturalistic in that it emphasizes the fact that the current 
structure of OTC markets and products is a response to client needs; well adjusted to 
what is demanded, it should not be put in question. The chief lobbyist of the ISDA, for 
example, judges that excessive standardization might only encourage speculation, and 
will not contribute to anything positive, while custom-made products answer the needs of 
enterprises and investors. Similarly, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch: 
 “there are many reasons why clients prefer to trade derivatives OTC in certain circumstances, 
including pricing, confidentiality and operational ease. We do not believe that reducing this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Source: Financial Times; 23.9/2010 
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consumer choice will represent a positive development for the market.” 
 
Second, the nature of OTC products, which are bespoke, and involve infrequent, long 
lasting, large transactions render them very suitable to specific financial strategies. 
Upsetting the market structure for these products will make these strategies useless, at the 
detriment of what major market actors do not hesitate to call market efficiency. The 
WMBA13 for example says moving OTC instruments onto exchanges could increase risk 
by limiting companies' ability to tailor hedges to suit their needs. Within the Mifid-
consultation, several banks concur to this view. For Goldman Sachs, mandating 
standardized products could limit a market participant’s ability to hedge, leaving it 
exposed to risk, and potentially a loss of hedge accounting treatment. The British Bankers 
Association develops the same argument along the following line  
“It is also important to understand that the main use of the OTC FX market is to allow corporates 
to hedge future exposures. They therefore require an ability to trade against specific dates or to 
cover specific, changing circumstances. Because of the bespoke nature of these transactions it is 
crucial that the dealer market retains the ability to trade with each other in a bespoke manner.  
Failure to do this will lead to significant risk mismatch and large P&L swings”. 
 
 
On the whole, in their defense of the status quo on OTC market structure, major dealers 
are entailed to develop views that contradict usual financial wisdom. According to them, 
fully transparent price competition is not desirable on OTC markets, standardization is 
not a means to improve liquidity, absence of liquidity is in the same time minimized if 
not denied and depicted as a given on these type of markets. To articulate these views, 
which are heterodox as regards standard financial theory, major dealers are cornered to 
invoke a specific nature of OTC markets, which they have difficulties to define 
convincingly. They lack an alternative conceptualization of efficient financial markets 
beyond the traditional walrasian paradigm. This raises a question over the extent to 
which this theoretical deficit is likely to constitute a significant handicap for major 
dealers in their struggle against regulation or not. 	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Wholesale Market Brokers Association 
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Conclusion 
 
The regulatory change planned to transform financial OTC markets into organized 
markets provides us with an opportunity to study the processes and the means by which 
powerful actors resist categorization and contest a certain vision of the market. 
Undermining the categories proposed by the regulator, and arguing they are either 
irrelevant or impossible to implement in practice, major dealers devote a great time and 
energy creating incommensurability. Their battlefield is twofold: first, they debate on 
product categorization and second, on platforms or venues categorization. This results in 
a blossoming of definitions and a multiplication of acronyms, conveying the notion that 
the matter at stake is highly complex and the regulation will be difficult to implement in 
practice. Beyond the creation of incommensurables, major dealers directly attempt to 
defend social boundaries and protect the “clubby” nature of OTC markets. Their aim here 
is to control the access of other market participants and defend their status by imposing 
conditions that would result in preserving the status quo. Overall, the struggle against the 
regulation to come is a struggle over a market form. This is the reason why contesting the 
regulator’s view that OTC markets can easily become organized markets, incumbent 
banks are cornered to develop the notion of a specific nature of OTC markets. However, 
they lack the conceptualization allowing for a precise definition of this nature. This raises 
the question of how they can overcome this weakness in their argumentation against 
regulation.  
Our paper contributes to the literature devoted to the political nature of categorization 
(Lounsbury & Rao, 2004; Zhao, 2005) and the idea that categories are products of 
political processes. We concur with Lounsbury and Rao (2004) in providing evidence 
that, facing unwanted change, incumbent firms struggle for categorization’s status quo. 
We argue their efforts can be interpreted as an attempt to build incommensurability. This 
process cannot be taken for granted (Desrosières, 1990; Healy, 2004) and requires work 
(Zelizer, 1985; Porter, 1996). Two main features can be highlighted as regards the 
struggle over categorization in our field. One is the role played by the hyper-
sophistication and technicity of the debate, which serve as a veil in the debate between 
the regulation pros-and-cons. The use of acronyms, the contestation of categories, the 
multiplication of definitions are used by incumbent firms to convey a vision where the 
present social order is too complex to be easily transformed. The other feature is the part 
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taken by theory – here financial theory- as a cultural repertoire for parties at stake in the 
debate. As the legislative attempt heavily relies on standard theory and draws its 
legitimacy from it, dominant actors, in their struggle against change, are forced to 
advocate its irrelevance as providing solution to remedy the issues targeted by the 
regulator. They find themselves having to resort to some ad hoc defence, which let them 
devoid from the traditional legitimate cultural repertoire. This raises the question of the 
role this weakness is likely to play in the struggle over regulation. To what extent will 
major actors which resources in economic power and lobbying capacity are huge, be 
handicapped by the lack of legitimatizing theoretical and cultural apparatus? The answer 
to this question partly depends on whether the debate occurs in a regime of justification 
as opposed to a regime of domination (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991/2006; Boltanski, 
2009). As we showed elsewhere (Huault and Rainelli, 2011), one can suspect that, over 
the recent period, financial actors have been engaged in domination rather than 
justification processes, exerting their capacity to “restrict critical space” (Boltanski, 2009: 
176) and not having very much to align discourse and action. Hyper-instrumentalization 
and ultra-technicality of financial markets have allowed them to set game rules and 
prevent external actors, from intervening, criticising and debating, pushing the financially 
uninitiated further and further from any democratic decision making. The question of the 
relevance of the strength of the cultural repertoires at stake, which emerges in our field is 
thus heavily related to the question of whether the regulation wave will force major actors 
of the financial markets to enter in a regime, new to them, where they have to justify and 
legitimate their actions much more than they used to. 
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